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Thirty-one countries from war-torn Afghanistan to Yemen are queued for membership in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Despite the disarray in the current Doha Round of trade talks 
and the growing number of regional and bilateral trade agreements being struck outside the WTO 
arena, few would-be members are ready to give up their place in line. The reasons officials give for 
staying in the queue range from improved market access for their exports to the positive signal — a 
seal of approval really — that WTO membership sends to the global trading and investment 
community.  
 
“WTO accession provides a predictable business environment and gives a powerful guarantee to 
investors that there will be no policy reversals,” says Mamo Mihretu, an Ethiopian trade lawyer 
and consultant examining the impact of WTO accession for the Ethiopian government. Attracting 
foreign investors is critical to Ethiopia’s long-term strategy to boost exports to promote economic 
development and alleviate poverty. “WTO accession is one means of doing that,” says Mihretu.  
 
To become a full-fledged WTO member, Ethiopia must negotiate a separate set of legally binding 
commitments with each member of its Working Party — the body created to consider would-be 
members’ applications. Any WTO member can join any Working Party and all Working Party 
members must approve the acceding country’s application.  
 
Critics have long claimed that negotiating a unique entry cost for each new member leaves the 
accession process open to abuse by Working Party countries looking to gain a commercial 
advantage over would-be rivals. 
 
“It seems paradoxical,” says Simon Evenett, Professor of International Trade and Economic 
Development at Switzerland’s University of St Gallen, “that an institution like the WTO, which 
describes itself as a rules-based organization, doesn’t have a rule on what price you have to pay to 
join it.” 
 
The legal instruments outlining the accession process offer little guidance to acceding countries, 
stating simply that new members will be welcomed into the WTO on “terms to be agreed.”   
The absence of standardized rules, says Evenett, fuels a steady stream of “hearsay, suspicion, and 
rumor,” including claims that the accession process is too costly and complex, takes longer to 
complete, subjects new applicants to tighter rules than existing WTO members obey, and ignores 
the human and financial constraints of developing countries. 
 
To separate fact from fiction, Evenett drew upon a network of Southern and Northern researchers 
to examine the costs and benefits to developing countries of WTO accession. With support from 
Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Switzerland’s World Trade 
Institute Foundation, network members pored over the experience of the 20 countries that have 
joined the WTO since its creation in 1995. 
Criticism warranted 
The study results lend credence to critics’ charges that the accession process is becoming more 
onerous and costly.  
 
“Since 1995, the time taken to become a full member has risen steadily and now stands at almost 
10 years,” says Evenett. 
 
So too has the price if the levels at which would-be members can set their tariffs — known as tariff 
bindings — are used as a proxy. Newer members are increasingly asked to set their tariff bindings 
at levels below the ceilings agreed to during earlier Uruguay Round trade negotiations. In other 
words, recent WTO members have opened their markets more fully to imported goods than did 
earlier entrants into the multilateral trading system. This has serious implications for local labour 
markets, especially in industries that must compete with imported goods and services in the local 
marketplace.  
 
Then there are the “nonmarket access” rules new members must negotiate. Some, such as Jordan’s 
commitment to give international treaties precedence over any national laws or state acts, go well 
beyond commitments made during the Uruguay Round. Others may require an acceding country to 
forgo rights guaranteed to current WTO members. Ecuador, for example, agreed to eliminate all 
state subsidies before its date of accession and to never introduce them afterwards.  
 
While critics maintain that these “WTO+” commitments and “WTO-” rights fly in the face of the 
organization’s founding principles of equal treatment and nondiscrimination for all members, 
Evenett is more guarded in his assessment. “To the extent that there are WTO+ and WTO- 
commitments, they have the potential for creating second class citizens within the WTO system.” 
 
The real question, however, says Evenett, is not whether the price of accession is rising, but 
whether it is worth paying because of the positive development impacts of WTO membership.  
“If that is the case,” he says, “then demands made by WTO members — rich and poor — of 
acceding countries might simply be a case of ‘tough love.’ Otherwise, it’s simply a power play 




Making the most of accession 
Cambodia may be a minor player on the global garment scene, but the 
industry plays a critical role in the economy of this least developed 
country (LDC). According to the  International Labour Organization 
(ILO), garment manufacturers account for almost 80% of Cambodia’s 
exports, employ some 270 000 — mostly female — workers, and 
generate 12% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product. Little wonder 
that Cambodian officials felt the need to act when the industry was 
threatened by the demise of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 
December 2004.  
 
“Our exports are dominated by the garment industry and we knew that if 
we didn’t shape up quickly, we were going to lose out to our big northern 
brother, China,” says Sok Siphana, Secretary of State for the Ministry of 
Commerce, who shepherded Cambodia’s WTO accession. 
Under the MFA, Cambodia became a leading supplier of garments to the 
United States and, to a lesser extent, the European Union, growing an 
export market that didn’t exist in 1994 to one worth US$1.9 billion eight 
years later. 
 
The end of the MFA was “a strong motivating factor” in the 
government’s decision to seek WTO accession in 1994, says the US-
educated Siphana. So too was Cambodia’s desire to leave behind its 
legacy of civil war and economic isolation. “The issue was not whether 
we should enter [the WTO] or not — we had no choice. But now that we 
have made the decision, how do we make the best of it?” asks Siphana. 
Cambodian officials made judicious use of technical assistance programs 
to define their negotiating priorities during the accession process and 
identify obstacles to implementing WTO rules.  
 
“From the get-go we labeled our strategy as pro-poor,” says Siphana. 
“We are very conscious, however, that a trade policy that brings growth 
will not automatically reduce poverty. There is a tenuous link between 
[trade] liberalization and poverty. So we kept our strategy simple: the 
more jobs we can create, the more we can reduce poverty.”  
 
To create jobs, Cambodia has faced some difficult tradeoffs. In 1999, for 
example, Cambodian trade negotiators obtained increased garment 
industry access to the lucrative US market by agreeing to tougher labour 
standards in manufacturing operations. The agreement to link market 
access and labour standards was roundly criticized by other LDCs that see 
the labour standard issue as thinly veiled protectionism – a less obvious 
means of limiting developing-country exports to Northern markets.  
“We had demonstrations in front of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Labour for months,” says Siphana. “Five years later it has proven to be 
the best risk we could have taken. We cannot compete for cheap labour 
against our bigger neighbours. Having core labour standards respected 
and the ILO as a guarantor will help us keep our market share by 
attracting manufacturers selling to the high end garment market where 
corporate social responsibility is important.”  
 
For a poor country the size of Cambodia, market access is the key to 
attracting the foreign investment needed to create jobs, says Siphana. 
“The WTO accession process has become an overarching national 
framework to allow us to institute broader political and economic reforms 
that will open our economy and better integrate trade with development 
and poverty alleviation.”  
 
Cambodia’s accession has its critics, however. Opponents state that 
Cambodian negotiators ignored the plight of the country’s rural people 
who make a living from agriculture. International humanitarian agencies, 
such as OXFAM and Médecins Sans Frontières, maintain that WTO rules 
will limit access of Cambodia’s HIV sufferers to cheaper generic drugs. 
Other LDCs claim that Cambodia has set a benchmark that is dangerously 
high for other poor nations seeking WTO membership. 
 
“The WTO is not a panacea. There are costs and there are risks,” says 
Siphana. “But if you look at the balance sheet, the pluses outweigh the 
minuses. We chose not to wait around and go with the pack even though 
we are a LDC. This is survival for us. When factories start closing, 
sympathy won’t help us.”  
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